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On the evening news of Tuesday 24 July 1979, it was 
announced that when the House resumed that evening, the 
Prime Minister, the Rt Hon. R. D. Muldoon, would make a 
statement of national importance on the wages issue. 
To the background of continuing industrial unrest that 
had been a feature of the on-going award-setting Drivers' 
negotiations, and to the background of a Federation of 
Labour application to the Arbitration Court for consider-
ation of a minimum living wage (in place of the usual 
general wage order application), the Prime Minister duly 
made a two minute ministerial statement in the House. 
In that statement, the Prime Minister announced the 
Government's intention to repeal the General Wage 
Orders Act 1977, and to introduce new legislation to 
authorise the making of regulations that would in turn 
authorise a general increase of 4.5% to be applied to 
all wages and salaries fixed by awards or collective 
agreements. The new legislation would also include 
provision to influence wages by regulation, and to retain 
powers to control prices should that prove necessary. 
Further, he announced he proposed to call a conference 
of employers, trade unions, and the Government, to consider 
new methods of fixing wages and salaries. 
The Prime Minister considered that the background against 
which the Government had reached these decisions demanded 
a full and detailed public explanation, and that he would 
make on a television and radio address at 9.30 p.m. that 
evening. 
As the announcement itself indicates, the intention to 
legislate had arisen as a matter of urgency, and indeed 
the Employers' Federation, the Federation of Labour, the 
Parliamentary Opposition and other interested unions 
and organisations were attentive listeners to the state-
ment and to the simultaneous radio and bi-channel tele-
vision address later that evening. 
On the following Friday, 27 July 1979, the Remuneration 
Bill was introduced, and within the space of the follow-
ing eleven days had received a second reading, had passed 
through the Committee stage of the House, was read a 
third time, and passed by Parliament. 
On 10 August 1979 the Governor General gave the royal 
assent to the Remuneration Act -
"An Act to authorise the making of regulations for 
the purpose of promoting stability in rates of 
remuneration and other conditions of employment 
in New Zealand and to repeal the General Wage 
Orders Act 1977." 
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In viewing the legislative process as it relates to any 
particular enactment, it is usually possible to discuss 
the history of its construction and the various influe-
nces in the course of its development and passage through 
the House. 
In the case of the Remuneration Act however, because of 
its urgency, the circumstances of the announcement of 
the Government's intention to legislate, and because 
of the lack of consultation in its enactment, it is 
the Act itself which has been regarded as a statement 
of Government intention and influence (particularly 
in the year following its enactment), and for those 
parties hitherto affected by it (alluding to the introd-
uction of repealing legislation on 14 August 1980) their 
lack of influence in the issues which the Act had entailed. 
It is therefore appropriate to commence with a study of 
the provisions of that statement, since, in the circum-
stances of introduction, it stands as the major pointer 
to the influences leading to enactment, parties having 
influence in that enactment, and as a commentary on the 
legislative process in light of such an enactment. 
The paper will therefore consider the provisions of the 
Remuneration Act itself, and then review the previous 
legislation and the circumstances leading up to the 
Introduction of the Remuneration Bill. Consideration 
will then be given to the passage of the Bill through the 
House, to be followed by an analysis of the various 
influences in the legislative process. The paper will 
then conclude with an evaluation of that process as it 
related to the passing of the Remuneration Act. 
II THE REMUNERATION ACT 1979 
As the full title of the Act states, one of the purposes 
of the Remuneration Act 1979 (Short Title) is to authorise 
the making of regulations for the purpose of promoting 
stability in rates of remuneration and other conditions 
of employment in New Zealand. 
Section 4(1) is the general empowering subsection which 
provides that the Governor General may, from time to 
time, and by Order in Council, make such regulations 
('remuneration regulations') as appear to him to be 
necessary or expedient for the purpose of promoting 
the stated purposes of the Act. 
'Remuneration', as defined in section 2, means -
"salary or wages and all other payments of any 
kind whatsoever payable to any employee, or 
to the holder of any office, for his services; 
and includes any payment by way of expenses, 
refunds, or allowances to meet expenditure 
incurred." 
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Professor Alexander Szakats( 1hoted that the 'excessively 
broad interpretation' altered the very concept of 
"remuneration" and cut through the well-established 
principle that refunding of expenses does not come under 
it. 
"While the Wage Adjustment Regulations 1974 
especially exclude 'any payment by way of 
expenses, refunds or allowances to meet expend-
iture already incurred', the Act, repeating 
these very words, pointedly includes such 
payments. This provision probably aims at the 
growing practice of granting generous allow-
ances without the requirement of proved expend-
iture in lieu of salary increases. Undeniably, 
some expenses and allowances may come into the 
category of additional remuneration, but this 
is no reason to treat genuine refunds in the 
same manner. 11 (2) 
'Conditions of employment' includes the conditions on which 
any office is held. When read with section 3 ('This 
Act binds the Crown') and section 7 expressly exempting 
judicial and other statutory officers(3) from regulations 
affecting salaries, it is clear that the scope of the Act 
was intended to cover both private and public employment, 
with the scope of regulations extending to State employees 
however high their position(4). Mr Bolger, the Minister 
of Labour, himself saw section 3 as "continuing to meet 
the Government's objective of having industrial relations 
systems linked between the public and private sectors". (5) 
The only limiting criterion for the general power of the 
Governor General to make regulations is for the combined 
purposes of promoting stability in remuneration rates 
and in other conditions of employment. The subjective 
view of the Governor General as to when regulations are 
necessary or expedient is therefore not open to objective 
evaluation. 
The judgment of the House of Lords in Liversidge v. Anderson 
[1942 ] AC 206, followed by the New Zealand Court of Appeal 
in Jensen v. Wellington Woollen Co. [ 1942 ] NZLR 394, estab-
lished that where power has been given to a Minister to 
issue such regulations as appear to him to be necessary or 
expedient for a particular purpose, the Courts are not 
competent to inquire into the Minister's state of mind. 
Professor Szakats argued that this principle a fortiori 
would apply to the collective mind of the Cabinet where 
regulations take the form of an Order in Council. In 
light of the provisions of section 4(1) of the Remuneration 
Act then -
(1) - Professor of Law, University of Otago. 
(2) - [ 1979 ] NZLJ 390; 391. 
(3) - Viz. the Controller and Auditor-General, and the 
Ombudsmen. 
( 4) - The First Schedule· includes among other Acts that 
may be affected, the State Services Act 1962, the 
State Services Conditions of Employment Act 1977 
and the Higher Salaries Commission Act 1977. 
(5) - NZPD vol.424' 2028 (2nd Reading) 
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"Government policy cannot be a justiciable 
issue and no regulations may be called in 
question by application for review before 
any Court."(6) 
Section 4(2) provides specific regulatory powers anti-
cipating the purposes for which the regulations might 
be issued, though without limiting the general power 
conferred by section 4(1). Regulations then, may be 
made for the regulation, or provide for the regulation 
of (a) rates of remuneration or levels of remuneration 
or both, and of (b) conditions of employment. Any 
instrument may, as provided by any regulation, be 
nullified or amended, in whole or in part, whether 
or not it is filed, registered, or approved under 
any Act (c), and regulations may provide for the 
appointment of officers and committees and other 
bodies (including tribunals), and for the defining 
of their functions and powers (d). Any persons or 
classes of persons may be exempted by provision in 
any regulation (e) and regulations may prescribe 
offences in respect of contravention of or non-
compliance with regulations so made, providing that 
fines shall not exceed $1,000 and $20 for every day 
where the offence is a continuing one (f). 
The words "levels of remuneration" as introduced in 
section 4(2) (a) would appear to provide that regulations 
may be made for the purpose of promoting stability in 
the rates and/or levels of remuneration in terms of 
occupational relativities, and/or in terms of relativ-
ities of industrial groupings. There is, however, no 
requirement that such rates or levels should bear 
any relationship to economic factors. 
The definition of 'instrument' (section 2), means -
"any award, agreement, determination, or 
decision (whether that award, agreement, 
determination, or decision is recorded in 
writing or not, or in any regulation or 
Order in Council) that fixes rates of 
remuneration, or other conditions of employ-
ment, of an employee or holder of an office, 
or of more than one employee or holder of 
an office." 
As Professor Szakats notes, the wording of "agreement ... 
that fixes rates of remuneration ... of an employee" 
makes the intention clear. The idea itself was not 
nove1(7), but the definition may be seen as an innova-
tion in that the instrument itself need not determine 
rates and other conditions of employment, but may 
fix only other conditions which do not directly relate 
to pay, as the separate provisions of section 4 ( 2) (b) 
relating to conditions only, indicate. (8) 
(6) - NZLJ op.cit; 391 
(7) NZLJ op.cit; 391 
(8) - c.f. Wages Adjustment Regulations 1974 Reg.2 
"Instrument" Para. (d), covering "any agreement, 
whether in writing or not, made between a work e r 
d II an an employer 
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Further, although legislation relating to such statutory 
protected basic conditions as entitlement to holidays 
and matters of safety and health does not come within 
the scheduled list of Acts in respect of which regula-
tions are to prevail in the event of conflict(9), the 
Industrial Relations Act 1973 does so feature. 
Sections 93 - 95 of that Act (providing for the 40 
hour five day week and for public holidays) could 
therefore legitimately fall within the scope of any 
remuneration. 
Under section 4(2) (c), any individual employment 
contract providing for remuneration, either in accord-
ance with, or independently from, a collective instru-
ment, can be negatived (including the non-remunerative 
terms). The same applies to collective agreements 
whether filed or registered with, or approved by, the 
Arbitration Court or another industrial tribunal. 
However, determinations of the Arbitration Court, 
tribunals specified in section 6 of the Act, and 
tribunals not otherwise listed in the First Schedule, 
are exempted from the overriding effect of any regula-
tions, although any subsequent agreement reached 
between employer and employee will not be so exempt. 
Clause 6 as it appeared in the Remuneration Bill when 
introduced had not provided for exemption from cancel-
lation of determinations of wages and conditions of 
employment of the tribunals listed. Further, instead 
of the words "decided on the merits" in section 6(1) 
as enacted, the Bill had provided for the exemption of 
rates and conditions "determined" by such tribunals, 
and had not included specific provisions relating to 
agreed terms (as between the parties) incorporated in 
awards or principal orders by the tribunals listed. 
Amendments and new paragraphs were introduced by way 
of a Supplementary Order Paper at the Committee stage 
of the House. 
By virtue of section 6(1) as enacted, only those deter-
minations of the specified tribunals "decided on the 
merits ... and not merely embodied in an agreement 
filed or registered with, or approved by" those tribunals 
are not to be affected by regulation. As a result, 
conciliated collective agreements otherwise deemed 
awards(lO) are "reduced to the fragile status of mere 
agreements". ( 11) 
Furthermore, in wage-settling matters, parties cannot 
place before a tribunal merely the contentuous issues 
having agreed upon the majority, thereby changing the 
status of an agreement into that of a determination. The 
potential scope of regulatory power under section 4(2) (c) 
is therefore very wide when held in relation to the free 
wage bargaining system, and to the role of the Arbitration 




section 4(6) and First Schedule 
Industrial Relations Act 1973,s.82(9) as inserted by 
s.10(2) of the Indust.Relations Am.Act(No.2)1976 - a conciliated collective u.greement "shall be de~med to be and be known as a~ award made by the Court'. 
szakats NZLJ op.cit;392 
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In light of the wording of "or providing for the regula-
tion of" in section 4(2) (a)-(c), and in light of 
section 4(2) (d) and section 4(3), it is apparent that 
the task of actually determining rates and levels of 
remuneration may be delegated to an authority, tribunal, 
person or body, with functions and powers as spelt 
out in the appropriate regulation. Such functions and 
powers again may be determined as the Governor General 
deems necessary and expedient for the purposes of the 
Act. 
Under section 4(2) (e), although any person or classes 
of persons may be specifically exempted from remunera-
tion regulations, there are,however, no criteria specified 
for making such a decision. 
Specific offences may be provided by regulation for the 
necessary and expedient purport of the regulations in 
the circumstances in which they are made(12). Under 
section 8 of the Act, every offence against any remuner-
ation regulations (with the general principles of 
agency also applying) is to be punishable on summary 
conviction. In contradistinction, in relation to worker 
participation in illegal strikes, the Dunlop Report(13) 
of only the previous year had recommended that, in the 
interests of improving industrial relations in the 
freezing industry, criminal fines should be replaced 
by a civil penalty. In adopting that recommendation, 
the Legislature subsequently decriminalised the process 
of enforcement, even though the amounts remained the 
same (14) . 
Finally, in respect of the specific regulatory powers, 
section 4(2) (e) provides for the regulation of "such 
matters as are contemplated by or necessary for giving 
full effect to this Act and for its due administration." 
As Professor Szakats indicates -
"This might be called a superabundant clause, 
inserted ex abundanti cautela in case the 
general power conferred by subsection (1) and 
the specific powers enumerated in subsection 
(2) would not answer all possible contingen-
cies"(lS). 
As to the effect of regulations made under the Remunera-
tion Act,under section 4(5) any provision which is 
made by or pursuant to regulations "shall come into force 
(12) - e.g. S.Rl979/211 (Bulk Freight Forwarders)Regs 19-22 
S.R.1980/24 (Engine Drivers, Boiler Attendants, 
etc.) Regs 5 & 6 
S.R.1980/29 (N.Z. Forest Products) Regs 28& 29 
(withdrawn S.R. 1980/45) 
(13) - Sir William Dunlop 'The Application of Penalty Provisions 
in the Industrial Relations Act' 1978. 
(14) - Industrial Relations Act sections 81, 125, 125A 
(15) - NZLJ op.cit; 392-3 
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on a date to be specified in that behalf in the regula-
tions, whether that date is before, on, or after the 
date on which the regulations are made". The section 
effectively provides the power to regulate wages 
retrospectively, and further,· in the event of regulations 
conflicting with the provision of any Act specified in 
the First Schedule relating to rates of remuneration or 
conditions of employment, or conflicting with any proced-
ures and bodies providing for the determination of such 
matters, then the regulations made under section 4 shall 
prevail(l6). Finally, the exemption from regulation of 
determinations of tribunals under the provisions of 
section 6(1) "shall not absolve any of those bodies 
from the obligation to observe the provisions of any 
remuneration regulations."(17) 
As Professor Szakats points out -
"The repeal of the General Wage Orders Act 1977 
should be regarded as merely the natural 
conclusion consequent upon the purpose of the 
new statute."(18) 
This is effected by section 9 of the Remuneration Act, 
and, in light of the intention of the Government to 
provide for a 4.5% general wage and salary increase, and 
to make provision for subsequent general increases, section 
5 of the Act takes the place of the previous General Wage 
Orders legislation. It is under this section that the 
subsequent 4.5% general wage increase was made in 
August 1979, and a further 4% in July 1980(19). 
Section 5(1) provides that regulations may effect "or 
provide for" a general increase in rates of remuneration 
determined by awards and collective agreements. Although 
the subsequent general increases have been made by Order 
in Council under section 5(1), in light of section 4(2) (d) 
and section 4(3) as discussed, the delegation of 
the task of determining general increases to a body set up 
by regulation may be permitted. 
Furthermore, section 5 does not contain guidelines for 
potential wage adjustment (cf General Wage Orders Act) 
and the provisions of section 5 do not limit the provisions 
of section 4, particularly in relation to the application 
of the general increase and the extent to which rates of 
remuneration not determined by awards or collective agree-
ments may be affected by any such general increase. 
(16) - Section 4(6). 
(17) - Section 6(6). 
(18) - NZLJ op.cit; 390 
(19) - S.R. 1979/170, S.R. 1980/144 
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The Remuneration Act then confers in the Government alone the power to provide for general increases in the remuneration of employees or holders of offices under any award or collective agreement, and gives the execu-tive potential overriding powers in respect of rates and levels of remuneration and other conditions of 
employment, by way of regulation. Regulatory powers 
may therefore override the terms of individual employ-ment contracts, thereby affecting, not only the indivi-dual employer/employee relationship, but also traditional industrial interconnections in employer/union relation-ships. 
III PREVIOUS LEGISLATION 
The Arbitration Court had been set up by the 1894 Industrial Arbitration and Conciliation Act with the power to enforce collective agreements. In 1918 the Court was further empowered to amend award rates. 
During the 1920s through to the early 1940s,the 
Arbitration Court had also been given power to make general increases in wages as and when successive 
Governments had deemed necessary(20). 
With the advent of war, however, wages were regulated by Executive regulation, that power culminating in the Economic Stabilisation Act 1948, "an Act to make 
provision for economic stabilisation" authorising 
the Governor General by Order in Council to make such regulations as appeared to him to be necessary or expedient for the general purpose of the Act (the pro-motion of economic stability in New Zealand). General increases issued by the Arbitration Court under 
Economic Stabilisation legislation were generally 
designed to ensure a minimum living wage for low-paid workers. By the 1960s, however, general increases were being used as a method of compensating all workers for the rise in the cost of living. 
In 1969 the General Wage Orders Act was passed, making formal the powers that have existed under the Economic Stabilisation Act in respect of general increases. During the 1970s, however, on account of a more fluctu-ating economy and changes in industrial bargaining 
power, successive Governments used the G.W.O. system to compensate workers for the cost of living, while at the same time controlling wages by regulation. During that time also, the Arbitration Court itself went through a process of reconstitution and e xcept for a brief 
period of eight months, the General Wage Order Act was held in suspension(21). 
(20) - I.e. & A. Amendment Acts providing for increases 1921-22, 1931, 1936, 1940. 
(21) - Stabilisation of Remuneration Act 1971 
Stabilisation of Remuneration Regs. 1972 
Economic Stabilisation Regs. 1973 
Industrial Relations Act 1973 
Wage Adjustments Regulations 1974. 
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Under the Industrial Relations Amendment Act 1977, the 
Arbitration Court was reconstituted with its original 
full jurisdiction, and by the General Wage Orders Act 
1977 (lifting regulatory restrictions) was vested with 
the power of making a just and equitable review of all 
rates of remuneration. Furthermore, the Industrial 
Relations Amendment Act introduced a consistent system 
of conciliation and arbitration in that a right of 
appeal was provided to the Arbitration Court from the 
public sector tribunals having award-making powers. 
Following the 1977 legislation then, free wage bargain-
ing was again restored, although in the interests of 
economic stability, the Government retained the right 
to selectively intervene by regulation made under the 
Economic Stabilisation Act. 
IV BACKGROUND 
(i) Indications of Government Policy 
In late 1978 Mr Jim Bolger assumed the office 
of Minister of Labour. Early in that new 
role Mr Bolger was faced with the resolution 
of a number of potential industrial conflicts. 
Following the threatened strike by bank 
officers in the last shopping days of Christ-
mas 1978, Mr Bolger was reported as saying 
that "it is essential that the parties to 
a dispute endeavour to resolve their diffi-
culties through the conciliation and mediation 
services where they are available, and 
through the staff of the (Labour) Department, 
and that the Minister is not involved in the 
early stages. But if we are running out of 
time, the Minister has a responsibility 
to exercise some influence over the parties 
involved." ( 2 3) 
Later in March 1979, Mr Bolger presented 
five guidelines to good industrial relations 
providing that "responsible wage bargain-
ing" was carried out in the absence of any 
negotiation by threat or industrial black-
mail(24). The guidelines entailed -
(1) commitment to talk even when progress 
seemed impossible; 
(2) that it is not possible to legislate 
to solve all industrial disputes; 
(3) the system of industrial negotiations 
by its very nature is dependent upon 
a curtailment of the absolute freedom 
of the other side; 
(23) - Evening Post, 22.12.78 
(24) - "Post 7.3.79, in an address to Wgtn Branch of 
Inst. of Personnel Management. 
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(4) the Government's power to assist in 
finding solutions in disputes is 
shared by employers and organised 
labour; 
(5) relativity arguments are not merely 
resolved by legislation or wishful 
thinking. Mr Bolger also added that 
it was too optimistic to expect real 
progress in industrial relations 
until some restructuring and modern-
ising had been carried out in the 
trade union movement. 
Mr Bolger considered that on the one hand 
New Zealand is ideally placed with the 
'egalitarian structure of our society' 
to make . rapid progress involving employers 
and employees more closely in the day to 
day affairs of business, but that where 
disputes arose, the parties must find a 
solution themselves within the existing 
industrial framework. On the other hand, 
he could see that the continued existence 
of a voluntary system of arbitration in which 
both employers and unions agreed to, was 
'obviously' being undermined(25), suggesting 
that the approximately 300 unions indepen-
dently negotiating awards should be better 
organised into industrial rather than 
occupational groupings(26). 
The new round of award negotiations for the 
1979/80 year were to begin in May, which 
had become usual because of expiry dates, 
the Drivers negotiations setting the trend 
for following negotiations. The previous 
year had seen a steep increase in the 
average percent increase in award rates(27), 
and in March 1979 the Prime Minister 
indicated that that round had been too high 
in light of the ability of the economy to 
sustain such increases, and considered that 
the new round should not be as high. If 
such a trend arose, then the Government 
had two options, (1) direct wage restraints; 
(2) increased direct taxation(28). Likewise, 
Mr Bolger in April said in Parliament that 
the economy could continue to deteriorate 
unless wage increases were held to the rate 
of growth in productivity(29). 
(25) - at this stage there were disputes involving ferry engineers, 
ANZ Bank Engineers, refrigerated lorry drivers, brewery 
boiler attendants, MAF vets., Auckland & Chch freight 
forwarders and commercial printers. 
(26) - "Post" 27.3.79 
(27) - Negotiated wage increases in the 1977/78 round were around 8%, 
and in the 1978/79 round 10-12% (plus the effect of a Q·m in 
July 1978). 
(28) - "Post" 14.3.79. 
(29) - Address-in-reply debate 31.4.79. 
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(ii) Economic Strategies 
(iii) 
In January 1979 the New Zealand Planning Council 
had released a discussion paper examining the 
economic implications of the "double-counting" 
of General Wage Orders in award negotiations 
suggesting that wage increases should be linked 
to the increase in productivity, and that the 
Arbitration Court should have strengthened powers 
in monitoring awards(30). 
Balance in Bargaining 
In May the Federation of Employers issued a 
discussion document entitled "Balance in 
Bargaining"(31), a document expounding the 
Employers' concern at the inability of "free 
wage bargaining" to adjust to the economic 
realities facing New Zealand. The Federation 
saw the major problem areas as: 
- an inflexible system of wage relativities 
with built-in inflationary features 
(particularly the general wage order 
system); 
- settlements under "free wage bargaining" 
bearing little relation to the overall 
economic situation, to industry capacity 
to pay, or to productivity, thereby 
adding to inflation, reducing living 
standards and causing unemployment; 
the conciliation and arbitration system 
extending privileges to all unions, but 
with those unions which abused these 
privileges gaining the most out of the 
system; 
- too many separate pay determinations 
procedures fixing the wages of the 
same person; and 
- too many awards and collective agreements. 
The document strongly argued that wage and salary 
movements have to be related to economic reality, 
and although firmly believing a free and 
responsible wage bargaining system, is prefer-
able to any of the alternatives, argued that 
the then present wage-fixing system was 
manifestly incapable of gearing such movements 
to the country's economic capacity, or to the 
need to bring down the rate of inflation(32). 
(30) - "Economic Strategies - 1979" - Government Printer 
(31) - N.Z. Employers' Federation, Wgtn (1979) 
(32) - ibid p.10. 
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The Federation was concerned that the balance 
of bargaining power between unions and employers 
had shifted markedly in favour of unions, 
particularly those on the 'militant' fringe, 
with that power being used in such a way that 
made even an apparently innocuous settlement 
significant for the whole economy(33). 
The Federation saw the thrust of the paper as 
being that there was still a middle road between 
bureaucratic controls and industrial anarchy. 
Accordingly, the Federation proposed(34) -
- tripartite consultations between the 
Government, unions and employers before 
each wage round to assess the capacity 
of the economy to sustain wage increases; 
- modified conciliation and arbitration 
procedures where the parties could elect 
to resort to conciliation and arbitration 
(with renunciation of the right to strike 
or lock-out) or to resort to a two party 
collective bargaining process (with the 
right to strike or lock-out), but with 
stricter terms of negotiability and 
enforcement; 
- amalgamation of awards and employers into 
industry groups; and 
- a code of conduct for the resolution of 
disputes. 
The document was presented to the Government, 
and discussions with the Employers Federation 
followed. The Government, although in agreement 
with the basic arguments, did not agree with 
the total package. In particular, the Government 
did not agree with the proposed options in 
bargaining procedures, seeing the unrealities 
in maintaining a sharp differentiation between 
two methods of industrial negotiation. Further, 
the question of renunciation of the right to 
strike or lock-out received a mixed reception 
from Government officials. 
(33) - ibid; pps 14-15 "The employer is in a weaker position 
than the union. In these inflationary times, 
low profitability and inadequate case flow have 
weakened the ability of employers to withstand even 
short stoppages. The more so for capital intensive 
companies." 
(34) - ibid; pps 16-20. 
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(iv) Minimum Living Wage Proposals 
In opening the Drivers' Federation Conference on 4 April 1979, the (then) Secretary of the Drivers' Federation, Mr Ken Douglas, argued the concept of a minimum living wage(35), 
indicating that in some quarters of the union movement, consideration was being given to a 
new method of wage determination. 
That indication was again given by the newly 
elected President of the Federation of Labour at the FOL Annual Conference in May out of 
which arose the resolution -
(1) that the 1979 General Wage Order be 
based upon the concept of a 'Minimum 
Living Wage' which is defined as the 
monetary amount of tax-paid weekly income 
required to adequately feed, clothe and 
house a single income family and provide 
for them with the necessary social 
services; 
(2) that in determining the criteria for the 
'Minimum Living Wage', the following fac-
tors should be taken into account. 
(i) That such a wage should be 
earned without overtime, 
(ii) That adjusting the Minimum 
Living Wage for family size 
should be a function of the 
tax structure. 
(iii) That rewards for service and 
margins for skill should be 
additional to the Minimum Living 
Wage and that this campaign be 
continued until the objective of 
official recognition and payment 
of the Minimum Living Wage is 
attained(36). 
It appears that the Minimum Living Wage concept had its genesis in a Harbour Board Employees 
Union remit to the 1979 Annual Conference, and that the FOL Executive had taken it up as a 
recommendation to delegates. It would also 
appear, however, that there may have been some misunderstanding as well, particularly in that some delegates thought it to be ancilliary 
to an intended general wage order application 
that would also be made to take account of the 
cost of living up till the time of application. 
(35) - "Post" 4.4.79. 
(36) - FOL Minimum Living Wage Document, June 1979. 
- 14 -
Following the Conference, the Federation of 
Labour took its Minimum Living Wage proposals 
to the Government in early June. At that 
meeting the Federation of Labour explained 
the concept and informed the Government of 
its intention to take its case to the Arbitra-
tion Court, the proper forum in which the 
matter should be argued (the Minister of Finance 
having the power to present argument before the 
Court, under the provisions of the General Wage 
Order Act). 
The talks were conducted with the Federation of 
Labour having some difficultyin making clear 
its views (noting also that the Prime Minister 
had had limited communication with Mr Knox 
in his capacity as the newly elected President 
of the FOL). By the end of the meeting the 
principle was clear, and an undertaking was 
given by the FOL to forward its intended broad-
sheet to the Government. There was also some 
confusion as to an FOL undertaking to return 
for further talks with the Government, the 
Minister of Labour certainly being under that 
impression(37), although it would seem that 
others attending the talks were of the opinion 
that no such guarantee was given. 
An FOL broadsheet was duly circulated in late 
June, the document explaining the plight of the 
low-paid worker, and the intention to ask the 
Arbitration Court, when applying for a general 
order, to raise all the minimum rates in Awards 
and Collective Agreements to the minimum living 
wage. Workers above that minimum would then 
negotiate wage increases to maintain relativi-
ties (e.g. of skill margins) through their 
industry awards, while the rates of those on a 
minimum living wage as established at the time 
of the General Wage Order, would move during 
annual award negotiations. 
The Government saw difficulties arising from 
the proposals, but indicated its interest in 
the minimum wage as an after tax concept. On 
the basis of the FOL proposals, the gross 
earnings of those affected would have to rise 
steeply, and the statutory minimum wage under 
the Minimum Wage Act doubled. The Government 
saw that as imposing"some very real rigidites" 
on the labour market (e.g. would affect recruit-
ment, compress margins for skill and thereby 
distort relativities) and would, by proposing 
a large increase in total wage costs lead to 
an inflationary push that would be damaging to 
the economy as a whole. 
(37) - NZPD 
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The Government considered that distortion of 
relativities could be avoided if the increase 
in lower paid rates flowed through to other 
members of the workforce, noting, however, 
that this would defeat the FOL's argument 
about the social objectivies of its proposal. 
Rather, the Government considered what had 
to be asked was how much each individual 
could expect to get out of the economy if 
the country was not getting more out of the 
international economy(38). Furthermore, the 
Prime Minister had indicated that the concept 
of a minimum wage after tax should be incor-
porated with the General Wage Orders Act(39), 
indicating it would appear that the proposals 
required further examination, and that the 
Prime Minister also had anticipated further 
talks with the F.O.L. 
The Federation also had had informal discus-
sions with both the Employers' Federation 
and the Public Service Association and Combined 
Services Union. The Employers' likewise showed 
interest in the concept, but did not believe 
it to be acceptable as proposed. The Employers 
considered that the introduction of the minimum 
wage would prove to be yet another inflationary 
mechanism that would entail the passing on 
of higher wages to other sectors of the commun-
ity (the consumer and the exporter in particular), 
and that, because of its inflationary effect, 
and the prospect of above minimum wage rates 
being pushed higher, the proposals would not 
in effect necessarily provde the lower paid 
worker with better wages. 
Discussions with the PSA and CSU were apparently tense with these organisations not expressing 
favour with the Federation of Labour's package. 
As the public service organisations depend 
upon the movement of wages in the private 
sector for general increases in their wages 
and salaries, they were therefore jealous 
of retaining percentage increases, a high 
proportion of their members already close to 
or above the minimum wage as proposed by the 
FOL. 
(38) - "Post" 10.7.79 (Hon. Mr Talboys as Acting P.M.) (39) - "Post" 27.6.79, in an address to the N.Z. Society of Accountants. 
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(v) Industrial Activity 
Contemporaneous with the discussions relating 
to wage-fixing, the Government had introduced 
legislative measures which affected relations 
with the union movement in both private and 
public sectors. On 8 June the Fishing Industry 
(Union Coverage) Bill was introduced, excluding 
all existing unions from coverage of the 
fishing industry, and to provide the machinery 
for the registration of a single union (with 
the consent of the Minister of Labour) to 
cover that industry. Further, arising out of 
the NZE Department Workers' housing dispute, 
the Government had promulgated a new Part VIII 
of the State Services Conditions of Employment 
Act 1977 (introducing punitive powers), and 
introduced the PSA withdrawal of Recognition 
Bill (which would have, inter-alia, withdrawn 
recognition of the PSA as a negotiating body 
in that dispute), both on 22 June. 
Meanwhile, the negotiation of the Drivers' 
award, which had commenced on 29 May, was 
beginning to "hot-up". Negotiations were 
becoming increasingly difficult, and strike 
action had been threatened since 18 June. 
Following rejection of the Employers' latest 
offer on 2 July, the Drivers' Union announced 
a 48 hour strike from midnight 9 July, with 
the possibility of further stoppages. 
(vi) The Events of July 
On 4 July, Mr Bolger returned to New Zealand 
from an overseas trip, denying that he had 
returned to a major industrial crisis in 
New Zealand. Industrial troubles were not 
unique to New Zealand he said, but in this 
country they were always referred to as 
crises. In reality they were part and parcel 
of the democratic society(40). 
On the Monday, 9 July, with the Prime Minister 
attending a conference of the South Pacific 
Forum, Cabinet had seen the situation as 
"sufficiently serious to warrant disturbing 
the Prime Minister in Honiara"(41). After 
speaking to Mr Talboys and Mr Bolger by 
telephone, the Prime Minister, speaking to 
journalists at Honiara said "we are going back 
to wage fixing by regulation, unless the 
Federation (of Labour) pulls back (on the 
Drivers' strike) ... I have asked Mr Bolger 
to call Mr Knox up in the morning and tell 
him this is the end of the line on free wage 
bargaining" ( 42) . 
(40) - N.Z. Herald 4.7.79 
(41) - Dominion 14.7.79 
(42) "Herald" 10.7.79 
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That same day, however, in the interests of 
its membership, and in line with its stated 
intention, the Federation of Labour lodged 
with the Arbitration Court its application 
for a hearing of the minimum living wage as 
the basis of a general order. 
Mr Talboys, as Deputy Prime Minister, expres-
sed the Government's concern at the effects of 
such an application(43) with the Leader of the 
Opposition, Mr Rowling, coming out in its 
support. Meanwhile Mr Bolger had duly told 
Mr Knox that the Government's introduction 
of free wage bargaining in 1977 was on the 
basis of a "responsible approach" from 
unions, and that the Government did not view 
the Drivers' action as responsible. In turn, 
Mr Knox sought an assurance (no doubt impos-
sible for Mr Bolger in the circumstances) that 
the Government would consult with the FOL 
before any regulations to remove free wage 
bargaining were introduced. 
Speaking at an Auckland National Party on 
13 July(44), Mr Bolger claimed that the 
emphasis in free wage bargaining had shifted 
from "responsible" to "anything goes" wage 
bargaining, and that in light of the then 
present low productivity in New Zealand, 
with wages increasing 16.1% to the year ended 
April 1979, and the Consumer Price Index 
rising only 10.4%, New Zealand could not 
sustain that kind of wage increase. Further, 
he stated that: 
"If the 1977 formula is starting to 
weaken, if it is not measuring up to 
what is needed in 1979, we have to 
look at alternatives .... We must have 
national unity to meet our problems." 
Further, Mr Bolger recognised that while the 
strike had a legitimate role in protecting 
workers from unreasonable employers (here 
recall the Government's views on the Employers' 
'Balance in Bargaining'), it should not be 
used to make reasonable employers capitulate 
at the bargaining table." Rather, a major 
obstacle to solving industrial conflict was 
the unwillingness of unions to take disputes 
to the Arbitration Court. 
"If there's one idea we must get across, 
it is that we have a fair and impartial 
Arbitration Court and that it is a 
logical course to refer an award 
(43) - See footnote 38. 
(44) - "Star Weekender" 14.7.79. 
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dispute to the Court .... When 
organised labour can't settle 
arguments with conciliation, the 
next step must be the Arbitration 
Court." 
On 16 July, Mr Bolger took to Cabinet a 
report on wages policy, including matters 
of dissatisfaction with the current trends 
and the question of increases above the rise 
in the cost-of-living. Before presenting 
that report, however, Mr Bolger told reporters 
that he would not be making any specific 
recommendations for changed wage-fixing 
procedures at that stage. 
The use of the term "at this stage" does 
not exclude, however, an intention to do 
something at a later stage, and against such 
consideration may be held the Prime Minister's 
statement at the same time, and again from 
Honiara, to the effect that if some of the 
militant unions persisted with strikes, then 
the Government could be forced to return to 
wage restrictions(45). 
On 17 July, the Drivers again rejected a 
further offer by Employers. The talks were 
adjourned sine die, and further sporadic 
strike action was predicted by the Drivers' 
Federation advocate who in turn regarded the 
final offer by Employers as "the gun at the 
head approach" to wage negotiations. On the 
other side the Employers were asking how the 
country could substantiate the sort of 
increases being asked (the Drivers were 
seeking 21% compared to the final offer of 
9.5% by Employers), so early in the wage 
round. 
Mr Bolger commented that the Government's 
threat of a return to wage controls depended 
on the form of any action taken ("we will 
respond according to what happens"), and 
again repeated his statement that the need 
was to get through to the unions the idea 
that arbitration by the Court was a reason-
able and fair response when agreement could 
not be reached between the two parties(46). 
On 19 July representatives of the Employers' 
Federation, FOL, CSU and Treasury met with the 
Judge of the Arbitration Court in Chambers, 
to discuss procedural matters, and to fix 
a date for hearing of the FOL's application. 
(45) - "Post" 16.7.79. 
(46) - "Herald" 18.7.79. 
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The Treasury was not then ready to proceed 
(it appears on the ground of having to 
complete extensive analysis of the minimum 
living wage concept), and consequently 
the hearing was set down for 31 July. 
Also, on the same day union advocates met 
to discuss a unified strategy on collective 
bargaining in award negotiations. The 
President of the FOL indicated that the 
Federation was not prepared to accept Govern-
ment threats of wage-fixing or deregistration. 
"The Government with its attitude is threat-
ening. That's not free wage bargaining .... 
To me and to the FOL this is one of the most 
important conferences that we've (union 
advocates) ever held. There's no doubt it's 
a forerunner of many to come."(47) 
In the House also that same day (19 July) 
Mr Stan Rodger, by way of question, asked 
Mr Bolger for an explanation of a "Dominion" 
report of 11 July on the Government moving 
when something was disruptive enough to end 
free wage bargaining(48). 
Hon J.B. Bolger (Minister of Labour) 
"I interpreted the question posed by the 
journalist ... to be whether the Government 
would intervene in the day-to-day wage 
negotiations to determine whether free 
wage bargaining would continue, and I 
affirmed that it was not our intention 
to do so. I did, however, go on to say 
we would decide when major economic issues 
were at stake and were being aggravated 
by unnecessary industrial action." 
Mr Stan Rodger: "Have there been any sub-
sequent events that would warrant the 
Minister changing the opinions he expres-
sed to the press at that time?" 
Hon J.B. Bolger: "No" 
Mr Isbey: "When the Minister denied his 
intention of interfering with free wage 
bargaining was his statement a reprimand 
to the Prime Minister who is continually 
threatening to end free wage bargaining?" 
Hon J.B. Bolger: "No" 
On the evening news of Tuesday, 24 July 1979, 
it was announced that when the House resumed 
(47) - "Post" 19.7.79. 
(48) NZPD Vol. 424, p.1660. 
(Vii) 
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that evening, the Prime Minister, the Rt 
Hon. R. D. Muldoon, would make a statement 
of national importance on the wages issue. 
Ministerial Statement(49) 
The Prime Minister argued that there had been 
a considerable element of cost of living 
increases in wages negotiated, industry by 
industry, quite part from what had been awarded 
in General Wage Orders and that wage rates 
had kept pace with prices since the last 
GWO. 
Therefore, the Government had decided to repeal 
the General Wage Orders Act 1977, but in light 
of the anticipated wage order following the 
FOL application, 4.5% in wages and salaries 
fixed by awards or collective agreements would 
be made by regulation authorised under new 
legislation to be introduced. The new legisla-
tion would also include provision to influence 
wages by Regulation in the same manner as had 
been done in the past by Regulations made 
under the Economic Stabilisation Act, and 
would retain powers to control prices. 
The Prime Minister refused to debate the matter 
further (Mr Speaker noting the extraordinary 
procedures relating to Ministerial statements), 
stating that it was appropriate that the matter 
should be made public in the House, which would 
later have the opportunity to debate the new 
legislation, but that he did not believe 
he should take the time of the House to make 
the much fuller statement he would make on 
radio and television. The Prime Minister did 
state that the Government wished to be fair to 
wage and salary earners, and at the same time 
not to get into the position in which a wage 
explosion endangered the stability of the 
economy more than it was endangered by other 
factors, principally the (then) rapid increase 
in the price of oil. Further, the Prime 
Minister did not wish to introduce controver-
sial legislation on either of the following 
days set aside for private members and esti-
mates. 
During the later broadcasts, the House remained 
in session (Mr Speaker did count sufficient 
numbers for a quorum), debating the Appropria-
tion Bill (Finance Statement). Messrs T. de V. Hunt 
and Falloon on the Government benches added support 
(49) - NZPD Vol.424, p.1760. 
(viii) 
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to the ministerial statement, speaking of un-
substantiated wage claims, criticising 
the minimum wage claim, and applauding the 
resolute and strong action the Government 
had taken in the interests of the economy and 
the people of New Zealand. Further, Mr 
Falloon indicated that that action might only 
be the beginning, because "what flows from 
the announcement to abolish and repeal the 
general wage order legislation of 1977 might 
prove to be the demise of free wage bargain-
ning, unless a responsible view is taken by 
the Federation of Labour."(50) 
The Broadcast 
The Prime Minister indicated his intention 
to talk about "the economic affairs of 
New Zealand". He then described the wage-price 
spiral and its effect on the economy (the 
inability of the exporting sector to pass on 
increases in prices). In relation to the then 
present wage-bargaining situation, Mr Muldoon 
wished to prevent recent increases in non-
recurring items (electricity, postal rates, 
etc.) from entering the wage-price spiral, 
and that taxation and welfare policies were 
the appropriate methods to assist the lower 
income and larger families. 
Although he saw 'merit' in the FOL's proposed 
minimum living wage, and shared the Federa-
tion's deep concern for the difficulties 
faced by low income families ("The Government 
has no objection to the spirit or intention 
of this application") the Prime Minister 
regarded that the introduction of such a mini-
mum wage through the Arbitration Court was 
an inadequate and indeed harmful way in which 
to attack the problem. 
He argued that the .social needs of particular 
groups of workers could not provide the 
basis for across-the-board wage determinations, 
that a single wage rate could not cater for 
the whole ·range of family circumstances and 
that compressions of margins for skill would 
ultimately have disadvantageous repercussions 
on the structure of the workforce and the 
economy. 
The Prime Minister, in setting wages rate 
increases against increases in the C.P.I., 
argued that wages (in awards and collective 
agreements in the private sector) had keptahead 
(50) - ibid; p.1783. 
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of prices in the previous year. Because 
there had also been a certain amount of double-
counting of GWOs in award negotiations, the General Wage Orders Act 1977 would be repealed. The 4.5% increase to be authorised by regula-
tion under the new legislation represented 
the rate of inflation for the quarter just 
ended. However, the Prime Minister considered that that adjustment went beyond what could 
be justifiable in the case that was to have 
been heard by the Court (i.e. the smaller 
2.7% increase of wages over prices). 
Further, the Government had taken account of 
the level of wages emerging in the current 
award negotiations (which "appeared to be in 
the order of 10%"). The general adjustment 
plus award increases pointed to an overall 
increase in wages which he believed "accept-able", but "on the high side" when all the 
unpublicised extras were accounted for. 
As for wage regulations, the Prime Minister 
considered that the most likely instance where these wage controls would be used would be in the case of unions who used strike action to 
force wage settlements in excess of what would otherwise be negotiable. 
In conclusion, the Prime Minister pointed out that no criticism was implied of the Arbit-
ration Court which, in light of its precedents from the past (an implied reference to the 
1968 'nil' wage order and the Court's inexper-ience in considering family circumstances), 
the Court would have been unlikely to agree 
to the case put forward by the FOL. 
Rather, the consultative process De considered was likely to give much more satisfactory 
results for all parties. To that effect the 
Prime Minister indicated that he would be 
calling for consultations with the unions 
and employers in the common interest of the 
general health and development of the economy. He hoped that all interested parties would 
be prepared to sit down and with creative 
Government involvement work towards a "system of remuneration" that is fair to all and 
penalises none. 
In interviews(Sl) following, Mr Knox expressed 
his dissatisfaction,indicating that in light 
of previous threats by the Prime Minister, 
wage restrictions were anticipated, and that the union movement would not sit idly by. 
(51) - Eyewitness SPTV 
Checkpoint 2YA 
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Mr Jim Rowe, Executive Director of the 
Employers' Federation, welcomed a confer-
ence indicating that the Government's 
action would certainly cause less problems 
than the FOL's minimum living wage concept,and 
in agreement that wages were not the way 
in which to look after the plight of lower 
paid and single family earners. Mr Tizard 
slated the Prime Minister's use of the 
public announcement and the Government taking 
power to itself to change the ground rules. 
In his first major appearance as the recently-
elected Secretary of the ·FOL, Mr Ken Douglas 
focused on the avoidance of established 
industrial procedures (the Industrial Relations 
Council and the Arbitration Court), and the 
Federation's moves to remove anomalies in 
the relativities system of wage bargaining. 
V THE REMUNERATION BILL 
( i) Passage Through the House 
For the Government, the debates were led by 
a strong debating team of Messrs Bolger, 
Talboys, Templeton, Holland and Thomson, 
with the Prime Minister also, who was over-
seas for much of the time as the Bill pro-
gressed through its various stages. This 
indicates a representation of Finance, Labour 
and State Services portgolios. For the 
Opposition, debate was led by the then Labour 
Caucus Committee (Messrs Faulkner, Isbey, 
Stan Rodger, Butcher and Mrs Batchelor), 
with lawyers O'Flynn, Lange and Caygill in 
support. 
The Remuneration Bill was proposed by the 
Government to be an up-to-date version of the 
Economic Stabilisation Act 1948, that wage 
levels, wage increases and wage relativities -
indeed, the whole aspect of remuneration 
(hence the inclusion of 'conditions of 
employment' also being subject to potential 
regulation) - can play such an important 
part in the management of New Zealand's 
economy that without such regulatory power 
the Government would be helpless. The 
Remuneration Bill then was a version of the 
Economic Stabilisation Act for 1979 (at least) 
to regulate employers buying industrial peace 
and employees exercising industrial muscle(52). 
It was the wish of Mr Bolger, and that of the 
(52) - NZPD, Vol.424; e.g. Bolger p.2184 (3rd Reading) 
Holland p.2171 (3rd Reading). 
LAW LIBR.A.RY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF 'IK'LLJi,.1r, TON 
- 24 -
Government, however, that the regulation-making 
powers would be used sparingly, if at all, in 
the future, because it was the objective of 
the Government not to control or interfere 
with responsible free wage bargaining. 
Indeed the Bill did not regulate or impose 
wage controls, and therefore made no change 
whatsoever to the then free wage bargaining 
system. Other than for the setting of a 
general order, the Government saw it as des-
irable that the regulatory powers would not 
be needed for any other function in the future(53). 
That of course depended upon the actions of 
employers and employees in conciliation (some 
speakers alluded the control of militants and 
communists). The power to regulate was there-
fore both a balancing factor in free wage 
bargaining and a provision to encourage use 
of the Court of Arbitration and the other 
arbital bodies when disputes arose. The Bill 
preserved the authority of the Court and those 
tribunals to make pronouncements when a case 
is put before them. The development of effec-
tive wage-fixing for the next decade was one 
of the key tasks facing the country (as 
Mr Templeton argued), and the Bill was 
designed to rebuild the conciliation and 
arbitration system(54). 
It was conceded, however, that the Bill was 
not perfect, but a move in the right direction 
to control the wage-inflation spiral. The 
Prime Minister indicated that there were 
already mechanisms available for controlling 
prices (explaining the lack of price regula-
tory power as he had indicated in the broad-
casts of 24 July) and that the Bill was des-
igned as a holding measure until a more perman-
ent method of wage-fixing arose out of discus-
sions. The building and improving of wage 
and salary negotiating mechanisms would 
therefore also include the question of general 
increases. The general wage order system 
had outlived its usefulness under the present 
system of bargaining, and therefore equity of 
general increases and the separating of the 
cost of living factor from award negotiations 
was a matter to be included in the proposed 
tripartite and consultations(55). 
The Labour opposition strongly contested the 
removal of the General Wage Order system 
(53) - e.g. Bolger, pps 2027-29 (2nd Reading) 
(54) - e.g. Templeton, p.2038 (2nd Reading), Holland 
p.2171 (3rd Reading) 
(55) - e.g. Templeton, p.2038 (2nd Reading), Muldoon, 
p.1860 (1st Reading), Bolger 1867 (1st Reading) 
- 25 -
which by and large had been effective, firstly 
without putting anything in its place, and 
secondly, removing such powers from the 
Court of Arbitration and placing the power of 
general increases in Executive discretion. 
This would remove from negotiations the question 
of the increase in cost of living and would give 
no guarantee that union representatives would 
be heard by the Government, nor that a judicial 
decision would be made as to such compensation(56). 
Further, the Bill was seen as a blatant 
interference in the jurisdiction of the 
Arbitration Court itself. In querying the inte-
rpretation of "determined" as it appeared in 
the Bill as introduced, the opposition pointed 
out the imprecision in this area(57). Subsequent 
amendment was made at Committee stages however, 
having the effect of also making subject to 
regulation those provisions which the award-
making tribunals had hitherto had the power to 
include in, or determine as, awards(58). 
The extent of Clause 4 (in light of the Acts 
held to be subject to regulations where in 
conflict, and in particular the Industrial 
Relations Act) was also questioned(59), 
and the .lack of definition and criteria in 
relation to matters of stability, rates of 
pay and duration of regulations was criticised. 
The argument of the Opposition may be summar-
ised as the interference of the Bill in tradi-
tion and generally effective negotiation, 
conciliation and arbitration process, and that 
the Remuneration Bill was a distorted image of 
powers under the Economic Stabilisation Act 
(which included provision for consideration 
of factors other than wages, for instance, prices 
and rents). As Mrs Batchelor argued, the Bill 
should have been called the "More Power to the 
Government Bill". (60) 
Finally, the Government took urgency in the 
second reading and Committee stages, the 
Opposition unsuccessfully moved that the Bill 
should be referred to the Labour Committee of 
the House, and that the proceedings during 
the hearing of evidence be open to accredited 
representatives of the news media, and the 
Opposition primarily argued against Clauses 
4, 6 and 9 (the general regulatory powers, 
the role of the Arbitration Court and wage-
fixing tribunals, and the repeal of the 
General Wage Orders Act) in the Committee stage. 
(56) - e.g. Faulkner, p.1862 (1st Reading) 
(57) - Tizard, p.1864 (1st Reading) 
(58) - see discussion this paper p.5. 
(59) - particularly O'Flynn p.2059 (2nd Reading). 
(60) - p.2050. 
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(ii) Events During Passage of the Bill 
The Federation of Labour immediately consulted 
the Minister of Labour following the announce-
ment, in what may be seen as an official pro-
test, and an effort to have the Bill withdrawn, 
and requested that a meeting of the Industrial 
Relations Council be convened under the Indus-
trial Relations Act. There were differing 
points of view within the Federation of Labour 
with some argument for proceeding with the 
hearing in the Arbitration Court, and, if 
necessary, seeking a Writ of Mandamus, thereby 
gaining maximum capital out of the Government's 
interference in the bargaining process. 
The FOL executive, however, opted for the 
established procedure of formally stating its 
grievances in the Industrial Relations Council. 
The IRC was duly convened on Tuesday, 31 
July, following the introduction of the Bill, 
and on the day the hearing was to have commen-
ced in the Arbitration Court. Out of that 
Council arose the resolutions: 
(1) That this meeting of the Industrial 
Relations Council calls on the Government 
to suspend the passage of the Remuneration 
Bill until such time as adequate consult-
ations take place between the central 
organisations. 
(2) That the central organisations meet as a 
working party of the Council as soon as 
possible to consider how best to preserve 
free wage bargaining in New Zealand, and 
to report back to the Council. 
The FOL, which had requested withdrawal of the 
Bill, then withdrew from the IRC, which has 
since fallen into disuse, with the parties 
meeting with the Government rather than in an 
industrial relations forum (the meeting of 
31 July indicates to what extent the parties 
could influence Government within that 
forum). The Minister of Labour did, however, 
offer the parties time to make submissions 
before the reading of the Bill a second time. 
To that effect the Employers' Federation 
addressed a memorandum to Mr Bolger on 3 
August 1979, the day the second reading 
commenced. The Employers expressed their 
concern at the lack of procedures and 
safeguards in Government interference in wage 
negotiations and in conditions of employment 
(suggesting notice provisions), the industrial 
strife which may arise out of the power to 
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legislate retro-actively, the requirement 
for the tribunals in Clause 6 to have 
regard to regulations made under the legisla-
tion (suggesting that a requirement that 
those tribunals should have regard to the 
general purposes of regulations, and take 
account of matters or criteria specified 
in such regulations, in order to preserve the 
orbital powers of those tribunals in wage-
fixing matters), and that provisions relating 
to general increases might have been better 
provided for by amendment to the General 
Wage Orders Act. 
Finally, immediately prior to the commencement 
of the second reading, the CSU approached the 
Government (hitherto not consulted either) 
and expressed their concern about the legisla-
tion and their desire to be consulted during 
the discussions that were to follow the 
passing of the Bill. Accordingly, the Minister 
of Labour, Mr Bolger, gave the CSU an assur-
ance on behalf of the Government that they 
would be consulted and would not be forgotten. 
VI EVALUATION OF CONTRIBUTION AND INFLUENCE 
( i) Government Departments 
Departmental officials would appear to have 
been of major importance in the consideration 
and evaluation of wage-fixing and economic 
policies. Representatives of the Department 
of Labour, Treasury and the Prime Minister's 
Department were involved at all times in 
discussions with the Employers' Federation 
and with the FOL on their respective bargain-
ing in the balance and minimum living wage 
proposals. Departmental officials also held 
independent inter-departmental talks, either 
at the request of the Government to evaluate 
policies and to prepare 'position papers', or 
at their own initiative to prepare the back-
ground for Ministerial advice. 
Although the indications are that there was 
agreement as to the nature of the problem 
(the question of relativities, the effect of 
general wage orders and the question of 
militancy in negotiations), it appears also, 
however, that there was some difference in 
viewpoints as to how the situation should be 
resolved. The indications are that the 
Department of Labour opted for a moderate 
position in the interests of industrial 
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harmony (essentially a consultative policy), 
while the Treasury and Prime Minister's 
Department considered that firmer interven-
tion was necessary in the interests of the 
economy. 
The role of the Departments may be seen as 
primarily advisory, the decision on alternative 
options ultimately being a matter for political 
decision. 
(ii) Ministers 
In considering the Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Labour, their attitudes may be 
seen to a certain degree as an extension of 
the Departmental views and their particular 
areas of concern. The hats of Prime Minister 
and Minister of Finance were both entwined in 
the personality of Mr Muldoon. The circumstances 
leading to the introduction of the Bill could 
be seen as requiring both political leadership 
and economic management. As Minister of Labour, 
still relatively new to the portfolio and 
facing other industrial issues at the same 
time, Mr Bolger was clearly concerned for the 
maintenance of working industrial relations. 
In the circumstances, however, it is clear that 
Mr Bolger had to concede that while the measures 
proposed had an industrial relations component, 
they also had a "very big economic component"(61). 
Mr Bolger's attitudes in news reports appear 
always conciliatory ("There is always room for 
consultation in industrial relations" -
Dominion 31.7.79), and subject to Cabinet 
discussion. On the other hand, the Prime 
Minister was more assertive, especially in his 
use of the media to indicate his views on the 
Drivers' negotiations, and in demanding con-
tact before Cabinet Decisions (Honiara, during 
the debates and later during the Drivers' 
negotiations). Such contact and assertion 
obviously arises out of the interests of his 
portfolios, however,it would appear from the 
news reports quoted earlier and his demands 
from overseas at the time of threatened use 
of regulation relating to the Drivers' settle-
ment, that the acquiescence of Cabinet was 
always assumed. 
Indeed, an editorial in the Evening Post on 
25 July went so far as to say of the Prime 
Minister: 
(61) - The Dominion 2.8.79. 
(iii) 
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"He is the Government and he uses his 
supreme position as he alone thinks 
fit. Why, it could fairly be asked, 
is there need for a Cabinet, spec-
ially a Minister of Labour, or, for 
that matter, a Court of Arbitration?" 
Accepting some journalistic licence, the Prime 
Minister's influence continued to bear, and 
seemed to increase through to the later 
Kinleith dispute in early 1980, and is still 
evident in the current wage negotiations. 
It may therefore be assumed that the "very 
big economic component "in industrial relations 
was a major issue in the Remuneration Bill, and 
that the Prime Minister had the major influence 
in the political decision. As Dr Rod Alley, 
political scientist, noted in an interview 
following the television broadcast "Just before 
going on air, we called Mr Bolger for his 
reactions to this, and he struck me as someone 
rather bemused by the whole thing. He said 
"talk to the Prime Minister", and we said well 
obviously you're the Minister of Labour, 
what's your view of this, and he didn't have 
very much to say. I thought that response, 
as he read his newspaper in the House as the 
thing was being announced tonight was fairly 
indicative."(62) It would appear that one 
of Mr Bolger's earlier guidelines to good 
industrial relations to talk even when progress 
seemed impossible had now been superceded by 
the public interest in the economy. 
Cabinet 
It would appear, however, that there may have 
been other points of view in Cabinet. The 
proposals were studied by the Cabinet Economic 
Committee, and it would appear from the debates 
in the House that agreement was reached on the 
Remuneration Bill only on the basis of a 
halting measure in order to work out a wages 
policy that might suit all parties and the 
economic interest. Such points of view may 
be evidenced in the Cabinet's handling of 
the Drivers' dispute (avoiding the use of 
regulation) and the support for the current 
policy discussions. 
To that extent then, Mr Bolger, in particular, 
and the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Talboys (as 
evidenced by his statements to the Press and 
his debate in the House to the effect that 
(62) - Transcript, Audio Monitor Ltd. 
Checkpoint 24.7.79. 
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"nobody had said that the Remuneration Bill 
was the answer"(63) ) may have played an 
important moderating role in Cabinet deliber-
ations. In light of Departmental discussions with close Ministerial involvement, the swift course of events at the time, and in light of 
subsequent events (regulations and policy 
discussions), the ultimate political decisions on the course and content of action must be 
attributed to the full Cabinet. 
(iv) Caucus 
In light of the development of the proposals 
and the strength of the debating team, the 
extent of Caucus influence at the introduction of the Bill would appear to be minor, presum-ably as a sounding board for reception of the Bill (i.e. a confirmation process to present 
a united government front), and as a method 
of informing MPs and the Party of the need for 
such legislation. As evidenced by the debate continued in the House during the television and radio broadcast, Messrs Falloon and 
T. de V. Hunt argued very much along the lines of the general principles and attitudes of the Government, as contained in the Prime Minister's announcement. 
Variables in the degree of Caucus influence, however, are the depth of relevant information and the degree to which MPs as representatives of the Party may accept proposals. The 
influence of Caucus, however, proved greater 
later in the day (indicating minimal caucus influence in the Remuneration Bill) when it "privately rebuked Cabinet" for its handling of the Kinleith dispute(64). 
The Kinleith regulations had been referred to the Statutes Revision Committee which had 
comprised other than Cabinet Members among its numbers. The Committee received a comprehen-sive Department of Labour report which (while 
the Prime Minister was disclosing a list of prominent trade unionists who were Socialist Unity Party Members, and associating them 
with the Kinleith dispute) (65) indicated that the dispute was based on legitimate industrial issues (viz.parities). Further, the Committee criticised the effect of certain of the 
regulatory powers in the Bill(66). 
(63) - "Press" 9.8.79. 
(64) - Dominion 11.7.80. 
(65) - "Press" 18.3.80. Dominion 26.3.80. 
(66) - Statutes Revision Committee, report to Parliament 10.7.80. 
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Despite questions of full and detailed inform-ation and assessment of policy alternatives by Caucus in July 1979, it is still debatable whether Caucus, in light of the circumstances at that time, would have exercised any deter-mining influence over the Cabinet decision. 
(v) Parliamentary Counsel 
Within the process outlined, it is understood that the Parliamentary Counsel was given general written and verbal instructions by the Department of Labour. The matter was obviously political, and to that extent Par-liamentary Counsel would have had limited power to influence content, the legislation itself reflecting powers the Cabinet considered politically appropriate for the circumstances. 
In light of draughting practices since the Algie Report (1962), the extent of Executive power contained in the Bill, and the con-sequential effect such power may have had on arbitrating bodies, the legislation must have placed Parliamentary Counsel in an invidious position. 
The Public Issues Committee of the Auckland District Law Society (24 October 1979), the Statutes Revision Committee (the Kinleith Regs), Professor Szakats (Professor of Law, Otago) (67), and Tony Black (Editor, NZLJ) (68) have since criticised the provisions of the Act. Issues covered by this representation of legal interest include -
(1) the question of wages policy and 
differences in philosophy, being 
matters for Parliament to debate, 
with interested bodies having an 
opportunity to participate and 
comment,rather than such matters 
remaining entirely at the discre-
tion of the Executive; 
(2) the subjectively worded powers vested in the Governor General erode the 
power of the Courts to check on whether regulations made are within the law; 
(3) the power of the Executive to override by regulation conflicting procedures in other Acts, and to influence or 
prevent particular hearings by stat-
utory Courts and Tribunals, strikes 
against democratic and parliamentary 
principles. 
(67) - [ 1979 ] NZLJ 390 
(68) - Editorials [ 1979 ] NZLJ Nos 15, 16. 
(vi) 
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Indeed, Tony Black concluded that "the best that can be said of the Economic 
Stabilisation Act is that it is one of the heavier avian corpses hanging about the 
neck of open government. The Remuneration Act will be another." ( 69) 
It may be noted that in April 1980 the 
Minister of Justice, the Hon. J. K. McLay, announced new procedures for the making of statutory regulations. These procedures provide for a full report to Cabinet on 
consultations, level of disagreement, purpose and justification, and further, that at 
least 14 days be allowed between the date of making the regulation and the date on which they come into force. As Tony Black has noted in respect of that delay, however, "will 
economic regulations prove an exception to the rule?" , and, further, "But what is needed even more urgently is a means of ensuring that regulations remain as subordinate legis-lation and are not used, as happens all too frequently, in place of principal legislation. So how about following up with repeal of the Economic Stabilisation Act 1948?"(70) Such comments as to the scope of regulations would likewise apply to the Remuneration Act 1979. 
In light of the above comments and subsequent developments, it would appear clear that the Parliamentary Counsel was not an influencing factor in the structure of the Bill, rather the Bill reflected an instruction to draught legislation giving the Government similar regulatory power in relation to wage-fixing, as it has in relation to the general economy under the Economic Stabilisation Act. 
The Opposition 
The role of the Labour Party in the Remuneration Act was limited to providing argument in the House. The Labour Party argued chiefly against the general principles contained in the Bill, rather than a detailed clause by clause ana-lysis that may have (as the amendments to 
Clause 6 indicated) strengthened the Bill. This, of course, leaves an opposition in a difficult position, namely, permitting details to pass rather than suggesting amendments which may either indicate a tacit if partial acceptance of the Bill, or which may indicate an area which, although clarifying the effect of provisions, may lead to a redrafting to the advantage of the Government, and to the dis-advantage of those to be subject to the 
legislation. 
(69) - ibid.No.15(21/1979) 
(70) - 1980 NZLJ 162-3. 
(vii) 
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A deputation of the Party's Labour Committee 
(which provided the debaters and the strategy 
of the Opposition debate) met with the FOL 
on the day following the broadcasts. Mr 
Rowling had supported the minimum living 
wage concept, but the Labour Party's policy, 
other than an indication of respect for the 
principles of free wage bargaining and support 
for the GWO system, was never argued as an 
alternative policy. The approach of the 
Opposition was clearly to vote against the 
principle of the proposed legislation. 
In considering the legislative process, the 
Remuneration Act reflects the little power 
an opposition has to make its views heeded 
in the decisions of Government, especially 
when the issues involved are political issues 
arising out of competing policies propounded 
by the respective protagonists involved. In 
such circumstances the Opposition is therefore 
no doubt prudent in arguing on the basis of 
principle, especially where the matter may be 
best resolved by the inter-action, with the 
Government, of those protagonists concerned, 
and especially when the Opposition itself 
may not fully sympathise with the views of 
those protagonists. 
In the face of the public appeal that the 
Government had made (the need for moving 
against strong-arm tactics and the economic 
effects of the FOL's policies), on account 
of the Government's decision to legislate 
with speed, and because of matters of poli-
tical expediency (if the Opposition supported 
interference, it would alienate the union 
movement, and, if the Opposition supported 
the FOL policies, it may be seen as lack of 
political leadership in wages policies, and 
may be seen as sanctioning negotiation by 
force), the Opposition exerted little 
influence, although it may be seen to have 
performed well its role as Parliamentary 
watchdog on potentially oppressive legisla-
tion. 
Central Organisations 
Although deeply interested, there was little 
contact between the Government and the Employers' 
Federation, and the FOL. Further in the later 
stages of July relations between the FOL and 
the Employers' Federation had cooled, the FOL 
seeing the Employers moves in the Drivers' 
negotiations as being counter-productive to 
early settlement. There was certainly no 
consultation by Government as to bringing in 
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the legislation. The provisions of the Act 
would clearly indicate that. Likewise, the 
Prime Minister's remarks in an interview 
after his broadcast -
"Jim Bolger got hold of Jim Knox at some 
kind of a cocktail party (actually 
the opening of Watersiders' Federation 
new building in Wellington), about 
half past five or six o'clock tonight 
and had a little chat with him and 
told him what we were going to do ... 
and that's about as far as it goes." 
(my brackets) (71) 
The Employers' arguments were known, and in 
light of the minimum living wage application 
the Government had no doubt considered that 
no agreement could be reached on wage-fixing 
(either in or out of the IRC) before the wage 
round got fully underway in September. 
The coincidence of the application of the 
4.5% general increase (3 September) and the 
new wage round was no accident. Further, the 
Prime Minister was aware that certain unions 
had depended on percentage increases (e.g. 
tradesmen, engineers) to maintain relativities, 
and therefore that the minimum living wage 
application would not give them a similar 
guarantee. The further indication by the 
Prime Minister of an acceptable 10% rise 
in the wage round,therefore,provided what 
may be seen as a sweetner to the union move-
ment, and may be seen as an important factor 
in the lack of an assertive FOL response on 
the introduction of the Bill. Given Walkland's 
comment that "The most effective time for 
groups to operate is after a decision to leg-
islate has been taken, but before a Bill 
has actually been drafted and published"(72), 
but taking into account the complexities of 
the issues that required resolution, it is 
unlikely that the FOL would have changed the 
resultant course of events. 
The approach of the CSU to the Government 
indicates the degree of consultation with that 
major bloc of employees who, by virtue of 
Clause 3 of the Bill, were to be affected by 
its provisions. It may be said that Govern-
ment consultations with parties involved was 
inverse to the actual scope of the Remuneration 
Bill. 
(71) - Audio Monitor Ltd. Eyewitness 24.7.79. 
(72) - Walkland S.A. The Legislative Process in Great Britain 
G. Allen & Unwin, London 1968, p.38. 
(viii) 
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The central organisations then did not have 
any direct influence in the content of 
the legislation (despite the Employers' 
submissions). However, the known Employers' 
proposals may clearly be seen as an element of support. 
The Media 
The Media played an important role in the 
announcement of the legislation. The Broadcast-ing Corporation treated it as a news item, 
Mr Cross stating that -
"On a Government action of considerable 
national importance affecting every 
New Zealander, broadcasting enabled the 
community to be fully and intelligently 
informed on all known significant facts 
of the issue".(73) 
The broadcast,therefore, was not an emergency broadcast under section 36 of the Broadcasting Act. 
The delivery to the BCNZ of a defmation writ 
(in respect of comments Listener Columnist 
Tom Scott had made about the Prime Minister 
in relation to the PSIS 'collapse') on the 
same day as the Prime Minister approached 
Mr Cross with his request, may be seen as an accident of history. Later, Journalist Warren Mayne of the Dominion was served with a 
writ of defamation at the suit of Mr Cross, 
following an article to the effect that 
Mr Cross may have been under undue pressure 
as a result of the coincidence of request 
and service. 
While granting the Prime Minister's request, 
Mr Cross also wrote to the Minister of 
Broadcasting prior to the announcements, 
stating the Corporation's "right and proper 
role". ( 7 3) . (Later the BCNZ redrafted its 
procedures in respect of such requests,( the 'announcement' clearly falling within them). 
Further, Mr Cross, following a complaint from Mr Rowling, offered Mr Rowling equal time on 
television the next night. Mr Rowling refused, not wishing to become an 'accomplice after the 
fact' in debating matters on television which 
should be aired in the House. 
The episode must, however, raise the fact that the Media can be an important tool for the 
Government to inform the public and interested Parties of its actions without consultation with them, and without Parliamentary debate. 
(73) - reported in NZPD Vol.424, p.2160. 
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Generally, radio and T.V. presented inter-
views and research type commentary. In the 
daily newspapers the statements of all parties 
received attention, and were given prominence 
according to editorial slant. A reading of 
the newspaper reports, as indicated, reflects 
the growing Government concern with the events 
of July 1979, in light of earlier statements 
it had made on matters of the economy and 
industrial relations. The argument against 
such broadcasts is that the announcement, 
therefore, could have been made in the ordin-
ary manner, to be reported according to the 
newsworthiness as decided by the 'fourth 
estate', rather than by a decision by the 
politicians as to how the media should report 
particular issues. 
VII CONCLUSIONS AS TO INFLUENCE 
The Bill may be seen as arising out of the Government's 
concern at the effect on the economy of the July 1978 
General Wage Order, together with the increased wage 
increases in the 1978/79 wage round. 
The "trigger" would appear to have been a combination 
of what were seen to be militant unions obtaining high 
wage settlements as a result of threatened industrial 
action, and the application for a minimum living wage 
by the Federation of Labour. In light of statements 
made by the Prime Minister, and the Minister of Labour, 
it may be argued that the Government would most likely 
have taken some form of legislative action in either 
case. 
The "trigger" may firstly be seen purely as an economic 
issue in that the Government argued that high wages 
spurred the rate of inflation in an economy,which it 
was argued, could not sustain them. Secondly, the 
matter may be seen as a question of the relativities of 
. craft-based employee unions. In this respect both the 
increases gained in wage rates in the award round, and 
the concept of a minimum living had ramifications for 
the continuance of relativities within the wage-fixing 
system. Added to both these factors is the issue of 
compensation for the rise in the cost of living, and 
whether such compensation in itself is an integral 
or additional factor in setting wages. 
The matter then is a question of a wages policy within 
which the Parties may achieve an agreeable curtail-
ment of the absolute freedom of the other, whilst 
achieving benefits mutual to both Parties, all within 
limits which the economy may sustain. It may there-
fore be argued that in light of the indications that 
the structure of free wage bargaining,as it existed in 
VIII 
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July 1979 , was no longer capable of achieving those 
objects,that the Remuneration Act represented: 
(a) The permitting of the process of free 
wage bargaining to continue, but giving 
to the Government the power of selective 
intervention, and 
(b) a halting device to allow for the develop-
ment of a wage-fixing structure. 
The current negotiations would certainly appear to confirm 
that view. 
It would appear that the FOL application for the 
minimum living wage forced the issue, however, and 
made action by the Government in light of its economic 
policy imperative. Caught in the situation of both 
employer and employee organisations producing separate 
policies and caught in the situation of itself consid-
ering a solution to the wage-fixing problem (the inter-
Departmental discussions), it would seem that the 
Government deemed that decisive, rather than consulta-
tive action, was required. In light of the course of 
events, and the issues involved, it would appear that 
the Remuneration Act primarily arose out of industrial 
and economic concerns, but that the economic factor was 
certainly decisive. The Remuneration Act however was 
very much an act of Cabinet. 
EVALUATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
"The extent of the Government's consultation with groups 
is a function, not of its political weakness, but of 
its political strength." ( 7 4) 
Secure in its monopoly of political authority, the 
Government, as Walkland notes, can afford to consult 
group and Parliamentary opinion widely, knowing that 
ultimately its view of the matter may prevail. 
Although in the field of industrial relations the 
Government may have to steer a course dependent upon 
the actions and policies of the major protagonists 
in the field, consultation with such groups seen to 
have a right to influence policy is more likely to 
gain the widest possible consent for a government 
policy, before the initiation of formal legislative 
procedures. 
The Employers' Federation had affirmed its view that 
free wage bargaining was the best structure for wage-
fixing, but that the structure as at May 1979 was 
incapable of gearing wage-fixing movements to the 
economy. Further, the FOL had also resolved in May to 
campaign for the official recognition of the minimum 
living wage. 
(74) - Walkland S.A. op cit; 42. 
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Mr Bolger, the Minister of Labour, had earlier indicated 
in his guidelines to good industrial relations that there 
must be a commitment to talk, even where there appears 
to be no progress towards a solution, that employers 
and employees alike share the responsibility of the 
Government to find solutions, and that the problems 
in relativities do not disappear by wishful thinking 
or merely by legislating. In light of such concerns, 
and in light of the Government's concern at the events 
of June and July 1979, it may be argued that the 
Government was in a position to formally consult the 
parties to map out the wages policy that it had 
declared was required. The policy of taking action 
depending on what happens certainly militates against 
gaining the co-operation of all parties otherwise 
unsure as to what the Government policy actually is. 
Because of circumstances (the minimum living wage 
application and continuing industrial action), it may 
be argued that such consultation at that time was 
impossible. There are of course arguments to the 
contrary, namely, the right of the Government to 
be heard in the Arbitration Court, the fact that 
industrial action is part and parcel of a democratic 
society, and in light of the resolution arising out 
of the IRC and the current negotiations, that discus-
sion with employers and employees was a possibility, 
either before or after introduction of the Bill. 
As indicated, however, the Remuneration Act itself 
did not impose wage controls, nor regulate wages, nor 
change the then system of free wage bargaining. It 
did, however, repeal the General Wage Orders Act 
1977, but otherwise had no legislative effect on 
wage negotiations until such time as regulations 
under the Act were made by Order in Council. 
In this respect the Act may be seen to be an 
Act of'political law'rather than 'legal law' ("A 
rought test of whether we are dealing with 'legal 
law' or only 'political law' might be: which is more 
important? What the Statute actually says, or the 
fact that the Statute was passed? Was the Govern-
ment in question making law, or was it staging a pol-
itical event?") (75). The concept of 'political law' 
then, extends further than what the legislative provi-
sions state, and in this light the legislation may be 
part only on a more comprehensive statement by the 
Government. 
Such a statement may include re-emphasis of the 
political authority of the Government, as in an interview 
following the Broadcast:(76) 
(75) - Policing The Crisis - Mugging, The State, and Law 
and Order. S. Hall and oths. p.84. 






Mr Muldoon, you have on a number of 
occasions talked about de-registration 
(Muldoon interjects with "ah yes, ah 
yes"). You've been concerned with 
unions who are going for too much, and 
you've made it very clear that you are 
prepared to use a big stick. 
Yes, indeed. No shadow of doubt 
about that ... because we will not 
accept this idea of strike action, 
to gauge out pay settlements that 
the less militant unions can't get. 
And, I don't think the public want to 
see that. 
This is going to safeguard something 
for the weak unions and hold the 
strong unions down? 
Oh, I wouldn't say hold them down ... 
perhaps you know, wag the little 
finger at them. 
Later in a talk to an Employers' Federation meeting 
on 25.3.80, the Prime Minister referred to SUP involve-
ment in the New Zealand Forest Products dispute in 
which the Government had made regulations under the 
Remuneration Act: 
"The SUP is still in the act - but they're 
not going to get away with it ... it is 
important for all of you to understand 
that there is no easy way with these 
people, and I think the public are start-
ing to realise that as well". (77) 
Another possibility is that the Government is putting 
together in a piecemeal way "the necessary legal 
constraints to be applied at some particular future 
time" (78), either in the interests of attracting 
foreign investment to New Zealand, or to provide the 
necessary power for the Government to pursue its 
economic and energy policies without such inter-
ference as is considered disadvantageous to the 
future well-being of New Zealand. In this light the 
Remuneration Act may be considered alongside the 
Fishing Industry (Union Coverage) Act 1979, the later 
Commerce Amendment Act 1979 introducing penalty 
provisions for employers agreeing to unjustifiably 
high wage settlements and the later National Development 
Act 1980. 
Whatever interpretation is made of the circumstances 
of the introduction of the Bill (Mr Rowling thought 
it should have been called the "Recovery before the 
National Party Conference (if possible) Bill") (79), 
(77) - Dominion 26.3.80. 
(78) - Mr Douglas, Sec.FOL, in interview.Salient VUW 28.6.80. 
( 7 9) - "Post" 2 5 . 7 . 7 9 . 
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it is clear that the Remuneration Act is a statement 
to the effect that the (then) structure of wage-fixing 
required reconsideration and that the question of 
a wages-fixing policy should be a matter for tripartate 
discussions between the Government, the Employers and 
ilieF~. 
Following the wages policies talks of 1980 (a commit-
ment by the FOL arising out of the Kinleith settle-
ment), and Government agreement on repeal of the 
Remuneration Act, and reforms to the wage system 
incorporating the viewpoints of both the FOL and the 
Employers' Federation, it may be said that ilie 
economic factor in industrial relations is indeed an 
important and large factor, but also that industrial 
relations is an important factor in economic matters. 
The Remuneration Act, therefore, as boili a legislative 
statement and a political statement, points to the 
desirability of Government consultation with interest 
groups, particularly those recognised as having the 
right to influence policies affecting the public 
interest, prior to the commencement of formal legisla-
tive procedures. Further, the Act also points to the 
desirability of debating in Parliament differences in 
philosophy and policy, and the actual merits of parti-
cular enactments. Conversely, the Remuneration Act 
points to the fact that the Government may disregard 
such facets of the legislative process and place in 
the Executive power to control by regulation, passed 
in ilie peace and quiet of the Cabinet Room, as it 
appears necessary or expedient to the Executive. 
The Remuneration Act 1979 has been a poor reflection 
of the legislative process, and,consequently on those 
grounds,rather ilian as part of a wages policy deal, 
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